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Corporate Governance and Transparency in Japan 
Abstract  
Manuscript Type: Empirical 
Research Question/Issue: Are better-governed, listed Japanese companies more transparent 
to their shareholders? The answer is especially important to Japan given its cultural traditions 
and the trend towards a more market-oriented economy, where openness and transparency are 
valued. 
Research Findings: Better-governed Japanese companies are indeed more transparent in 
that: 1) they make more frequent disclosures to the share market, and their disclosures of 
good news are more timely; 2) they enjoy a greater analyst following, although the analysts 
tend to be more optimistic, less accurate and agree more about their earnings forecasts; and 3) 
their share prices reflect good news faster.  
Thematic/Academic Implications: Theoretically, strong corporate governance can protect 
the interests of shareholders through closer monitoring of executives’ behaviour and by 
promoting greater transparency. In practice, we find better governance structures have been 
only partially effective in increasing transparency in Japan. For the time being we beg the 
question, “Why is this so?” 
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Insights are offered to policy makers considering further 
changes to governance requirements. Many Japanese firms have already made changes that 
are more in line with recommended best practice, for example by reducing their board size or 
appointing independent directors. Nonetheless, although better-governed firms have tended to 
make timelier disclosures when there is good news, we did not detect a comparable effect for 





Corporate governance (CG) structures in place, whether within or external to the firm, 
can play a key role in resolving agency problems endemic to the corporate form. One 
commonly held view, often expressed in codes of best practice, is that better-governed firms 
are more transparent to outside parties because of closer monitoring of their managers and 
disclosures that are more informative. Typifying this view, the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) CG principles state the “CG framework should 
ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the 
company” (OECD, 2004:22). We would thus expect firms with better CG to be more 
transparent.  
Japan is a particularly interesting setting because it is an Asian country, it has a mature 
economy and it has one of the largest equity markets in the world. For historical reasons large 
cross-shareholdings between firms are still observed while many company directors, having 
been promoted from within the organisation, lack independence from management, retain a 
strong personal commitment to the firm, and take a long term view of investment (Cooke and 
Sawa, 1998). But the CG of Japanese firms has been moving away from the traditional bank 
(or Keiretsu) centred structure to a more external market-oriented system, where corporate 
transparency is valued. Changes to CG structures have resulted in smaller boards (Uchida, 
2011) and the appointment of outside directors. These changes have been encouraged by 
greater foreign share ownership and a statement of CG principles issued by the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange (TSE) (Jacoby, 2007). 
Although there have been earlier studies of CG and aspects of corporate transparency in 
other countries including Australia (Beekes and Brown, 2006, hereafter BB06, Beekes et al., 
2015), Canada (Beekes et al., 2012), China (Hass et al., 2014) and Malaysia (Lim et al., 
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2014), as well as a pooled cross-country study (Beekes et al., 2016), there is no direct and 
detailed evidence on the link between governance and transparency in a mature, non-Western 
economy such as Japan. This is an important gap as Japanese firms continue to adopt CG 
practices (such as the appointment of outside directors) which elsewhere have been perceived 
as improving CG quality.  
Our study addresses this gap by focusing on the association between ‘better’ governance 
and the degree of equity market transparency. First, we investigate the frequency and 
timeliness of corporate disclosures, which are indicators of market transparency because they 
reflect the policies and practices of the firm’s managers with respect to the supply of inside 
information to outside parties. Second, we look at transparency from the perspective of 
financial intermediaries and assess the extent to which differences in the level of bias, 
accuracy and dispersion of financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, and in the number of 
analysts following a stock, are related to the firm’s CG. Our third set of tests focuses on the 
speed of stock price discovery over the 12 months leading up to the announcement of the 
firm’s earnings for the year. We do this because, ultimately, the degree of a particular firm’s 
transparency will be revealed in the decisions of corporate insiders, market traders and 
investors who buy and sell its shares. 
We contribute to a growing literature on CG and disclosure in several ways. First, our 
study is extensive, covering over 1,300 Japanese companies with financial years ending 
between 1 August 2003 and 31 July 2014. During this period share ownership has changed, 
with fewer cross-shareholdings (Miyajima and Kuroki, 2007) and increased foreign 
ownership (Yoshikawa and McGuire, 2008). Improvements to CG and transparency have 
received greater regulatory attention: the TSE released CG principles in 2004 (updated in 
2009 and 2015) and from 2009, listed companies have been required to appoint at least one 
independent director or statutory auditor (TSE, 2009b). Also Japanese firms can choose their 
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CG structure: either the ‘Western’ style Committees system or the traditional Board of 
Corporate Auditors system. With regard to disclosure, greater requirements along with 
penalties for inadequate disclosure were introduced under the 2007 Financial Instruments and 
Exchange Act. Second, we refine the research methods used in prior work (BB06, Beekes et 
al., 2012, 2015, 2016) by expanding the models that are fitted, and enhancing the 
measurement of variables (e.g. to incorporate issues such as lags in reporting financial 
results). Third, we use a local rating system developed by Nikkei Media Digital Inc. to 
evaluate overall CG. It takes into account specific arrangements such as cross-shareholdings 
and bank ownership as well as attributes commonly used in prior work such as the proportion 
of outside directors. Finally, while there have been studies examining the link between CG 
and performance in Japan (e.g. Aman and Nguyen, 2008; Bauer et al., 2008), the link 
between CG and disclosure remains largely unexplored. 
Our empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, better-governance is 
associated with more frequent and timelier corporate disclosures, particularly if the price of 
the stock rises when the disclosure is made. More frequent and timelier disclosures are 
consistent with expectations and with cross-country evidence in Beekes et al. (2016). Second, 
we find better governed firms attract a greater analyst following; but while the analysts’ 
earnings forecasts are more concentrated around the mean, they do tend to be more optimistic 
and less accurate. In contrast, an earlier Australian study reports better governance is 
associated with less optimistic and more accurate analyst forecasts (BB06). The differences 
might be due to unfamiliarity among analysts with the influence of changing governance 
structures in Japan on the nature and credibility of information made available to outside 
parties. Third, regarding the timeliness of price discovery, price adjustment is significantly 
faster for better-governed firms on days when the news is good in the sense that the stock 
outperforms the market index, but not when it is bad. An asymmetric response to good and 
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bad news in Japan is inconsistent with some cross-country evidence of no significant 
difference in the speed of price discovery of good and bad news of better-governed firms 
(Beekes et al., 2016). Taking our findings as a whole, we conclude the adoption of seemingly 
better governance practices has had a muted effect on corporate transparency in Japan. 
The remainder of our paper begins by outlining CG mechanisms in Japan and developing 
six hypotheses that link governance to indicators of market transparency. Next, we explain 
the data and methods used. The results from fitting the primary models are then set out and 
interpreted, followed by a summary of additional tests we undertook. The last section 
contains our conclusions. 
JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Following deregulation of the Japanese financial system, traditional CG structures have 
weakened as a series of CG reforms have been introduced. 
Traditionally, business groupings, or financial Keirestsu, have been an important aspect 
of Japanese CG. Keiretsu arrangements can insulate member firms from external pressure 
while the sharing of information with major shareholders within the group reduces managers’ 
incentives for disclosure (Covrig and Low, 2005). More recently, greater diversity in 
ownership structures and the declining influence of the main bank have created incentives for 
greater disclosure and transparency to external parties, as firms attempt to attract increasing 
proportions of outside investors (Mizuno and Tabner, 2009). 
From 2003 companies have been permitted to replace the statutory auditors system with 
the Committees system. In the auditors system, monitoring and supervision of day-to-day 
activities is the responsibility of the Kansayaku-kai (the board of corporate auditors). At least 
three Kansayaku-kai members are to be elected by shareholders; at least half the members 
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must be ‘outside’ auditors (e.g. they must not have been an employee, officer or director of 
the company or its subsidiaries); and at least one must be a full time member (Mizuno and 
Tabner, 2009). The corporate auditors’ primary duties are to undertake compliance audits and 
to audit the financial statements alongside the independent auditor. In contrast, firms 
following the Committees system are required to appoint a CEO with executive authority and 
their board of directors fulfils a supervisory role (TSE, 2004); and in addition, audit, 
nomination and remuneration committees are to be established, each with at least three 
members and a majority expected to be outside directors. Although the Committees system 
has the virtue of being more easily understood by domestic and foreign shareholders, only 
about 2% of TSE listed companies had adopted it by 2013 (TSE, 2013). 
Unlike US boards of directors, which are dominated by outsiders, Japanese boards are 
dominated by insiders (Nakano and Nguyen, 2012). Changes to the listing rules in 2009 
require TSE listed firms to appoint a minimum of one independent director or one 
independent statutory auditor. While boards of directors are now of lower average size 
(Uchida, 2011), the focus remains on the board’s executive function, rather than its 
monitoring role. Indeed, the value of independent directors in Japan has been questioned 
given the importance attached by Japanese managers to firm-specific knowledge and 
experience (Buchanan, 2007). Buchanan et al. (2014:307) argue that “external directors 
generally do not play a significant role in monitoring management.” Instead, since many 
company directors have been promoted from within the organisation, much of the monitoring 
of senior executives is done by their peers.  
 
The TSE Corporate Governance Principles 
The TSE has recognised a need to improve CG and to this end it has published a set of 
principles (released in 2004 and updated in 2009 and 2015) regarding (i) the rights of 
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shareholders, (ii) their equitable treatment, (iii) relationships with stakeholders, (iv) 
disclosure and transparency, and (v) the responsibilities of the board of directors, auditors (or 
the board of company auditors), and other relevant groups (TSE, 2004; 2009a). Disclosure of 
accurate, material information on a timely basis is singled out as key to good CG.  Thus 
Principle 4 of the 2009 TSE Principles states:  
“Corporate governance for listed companies should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is conducted on all material matters including the financial condition, 
performance results and ownership distribution…Shareholders require periodic, 
reliable, comparable information sufficient to evaluate the operational conditions of 
businesses by the management, and further timely disclosure regarding material 
events taking place during the intervals between periodic disclosures.” TSE (2009a: 
9) [Emphasis added].   
Timely disclosure of “all material matters” is echoed in the 2015 CG Code. The board of 
directors, kansayaku board and external auditors are all responsible for ensuring 
appropriate disclosure takes place (TSE, 2015: 13). 
HYPOTHESES 
Corporate Governance, and the Frequency and Timeliness of Disclosures 
Under the listing rules, security exchanges in Japan require timely disclosure of all 
material information, which is currently regulated by the Financial Services Agency (FSA) 
(FSA, 2016). Prompt disclosure to the stock market reduces information asymmetry between 
the firm’s managers and its shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Bushman et al., 2004) 
and it may enable more effective monitoring of the manager’s actions (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2012). While disclosure is costly, its potential benefits include a lower cost of 
equity capital (Botosan, 2000) and a reduced cost of debt (Sengupta, 1998), since credible 
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disclosures can reassure investors and signal the firm’s quality. Greater disclosure is 
becoming more important in Japan as main bank relationships decline and firms seek the 
attention of outside investors. There are limits to the amount of information the firm will 
optimally disclose (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012) as further disclosures could assist 
competitors (Verrecchia, 1983). It may also reveal information which managers wish to keep 
private (Kothari et al., 2009).  
Prior literature reports a direct association between the firm’s CG and its disclosure 
practices. For example, greater monitoring provided by better CG is associated with greater 
disclosure by Australian firms (BB06; Beekes et al., 2016) and lower information asymmetry 
in USA firms (Kanagaretnam et al., 2007). Consequently we predict a complementary 
association between the firm’s CG and the number of disclosures it makes: 
Hypothesis 1. Firms with higher quality CG make a greater number of disclosures to 
the stock market. 
Institutional and cultural factors in Japan could also influence disclosure; e.g. information 
sharing within corporate groupings may have reduced disclosure incentives and resulted in 
fewer disclosures, but Cooke (1996) found no evidence to confirm this belief. 
Apart from the number of disclosures, their timeliness is also important to good 
governance, according to the TSE principles. The timing of a news release can, to some 
extent, be influenced by the firm’s manager, who may act opportunistically (Aboody and 
Kasznik, 2000; Kothari et al., 2009). Timely disclosures may be especially important where 
there is litigation pressure (Sengupta, 2004), or even a desire of managers to protect 
themselves against possible future litigation (Skinner, 1994). Cross-country evidence shows 
better CG (according to conventional criteria) is associated with more timely disclosures 
(Beekes et al., 2016). Following the TSE guidelines and evidence for other countries, we 
9 
 
predict better governed Japanese firms make more timely disclosures of material information 
to the market:  
Hypothesis 2. Firms with higher quality CG make more timely disclosures to the stock 
market. 
Corporate Governance and Analysts’ Forecasts 
Next, we look at transparency from the perspective of financial intermediaries, 
specifically financial analysts. We examine if the level of bias, accuracy and dispersion of 
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, and in the number of analysts following a stock, are 
related to the firm’s CG. The integrity of the financial statements and the availability of 
disclosures are influenced by CG (BB06). If information from better-governed firms is more 
credible, we would expect a greater analyst following since a richer information environment 
provides a better basis for predicting future earnings (Healy et al., 1999; Lang and Lundholm, 
1996). Prior studies of Australian (BB06) and Canadian firms (Beekes et al. 2012) report a 
positive association between CG and analyst following. On these grounds we expect more 
analysts to track better-governed firms. 
Hypothesis 3. Firms with higher quality CG attract a greater analyst following. 
If disclosures from firms with better CG help resolve some of the uncertainty surrounding 
their future performance, EPS forecasting quality will be associated with CG. Prior work 
relating to Western countries demonstrates CG is linked to the informativeness of disclosures; 
e.g. analysts’ EPS forecasts are less optimistic and more accurate for better-governed firms in 
Australia (BB06). Similarly, studies of US firms find a positive association between CG and 
analyst forecast accuracy (Byard et al., 2006; Behn et al., 2008). However, Douthett et al. 
(2004) find Japanese firms with keiretsu ties are associated with more accurate EPS forecasts. 
They attribute their findings to greater monitoring within the group, which enhances the 
predictability of earnings. Given the declining influence of corporate groups in Japan, and the 
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prior evidence linking CG and forecasting quality, we predict Japanese firms with better CG 
have less optimistic and more accurate forecasts:  
Hypothesis 4. Analysts’ earnings forecasts are less optimistic for firms with higher 
quality CG. 
Hypothesis 5. Analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate for firms with higher 
quality CG. 
The level of dispersion across analysts’ earnings forecasts for the same firm and over the 
same forecast horizon (Disagreement) proxies for the degree of consensus among market 
experts about the firm’s future performance. There may be less uncertainty about future 
performance if more information is available to analysts when making their forecasts, which 
could consequently result in greater consensus (Brown and Han, 1992; Lang and Lundholm, 
1996). Therefore if disclosures are more credible and earnings predictability is enhanced for 
firms with better CG, we would predict greater consensus amongst analysts. Consistent with 
this prediction, Behn et al. (2008) find lower dispersion in forecasts for better-governed firms 
in the USA. An alternative argument is that additional disclosures by the firm may instead 
result in greater disagreement as analysts seek to add value by acquiring their own private 
information, aspects of which may be weighted differently (BB06; Barron et al., 2002; 
Barron et al., 2005). However, in Japanese firms with keiretsu ties, where incentives exist to 
retain information within the corporate group, Douthett et al. (2004) find evidence of smaller 
forecast dispersion. Given the reduced influence of keiretsu and the divergent views in the 
literature, we make no prediction about the direction of any relationship between CG and the 
level of disagreement amongst analysts. 
Corporate Governance and the Timeliness of Prices 
In addition to examining the timeliness of information releases, we examine how quickly 
value relevant information is incorporated into the firm’s stock price. Firms are expected by 
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the TSE to disclose price sensitive information before it is leaked to the market and indeed, 
firms with appropriate CG structures may monitor price movements to ensure they meet their 
disclosure obligations. Prior evidence, though, shows both complementary and substitution 
relationships between the speed of stock price discovery and CG. Specifically, a cross-
country study by Beekes et al. (2016) finds CG is associated on the whole with less timely 
price discovery, which they attribute either to a substitution effect (better and more costly 
governance structures are adopted to compensate for lower transparency) or to the market 
taking longer to digest the greater amount of information released by better-governed firms. 
However both BB06 and Beekes et al. (2015) find better-governed Australian firms have 
more timely price discovery (i.e. a complementary relation), which is in line with the TSE’s 
assumption that better CG is associated with more timely price discovery. Our sixth 
hypothesis is consistent with the TSE view: 
Hypothesis 6. Stock price discovery is faster for firms with higher quality CG. 
SAMPLE AND DATA 
We focus on Japanese firms with financial years ending between 1 August 2003 and 31 
July 2014. Two samples are used, reflecting the frequency of observation: one sample, based 
on annual data, is used to fit the document and timeliness of prices models; the other sample, 
based on monthly data, is used to fit the analyst forecast models. The documents and prices 
sample is restricted to firms in the First Section of the TSE with financial years ending 
between 1 August 2003 and 31 July 2013 (data were too sparse to include 2014). The second 
sample comprises firms listed on any Japanese exchange and included in the Thomson 
Reuters Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. Cases in the second sample 
are confined to firms with at least two analysts contributing to the consensus forecast, so that 
there is a value for forecast dispersion, and a forecast horizon of 1 to 11 months to avoid 
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including more than one consensus forecast for the same firm at the same point in time, and 
to financial years ending between 1 August 2003 and 31 July 2014. 
Our source of CG data is the Nikkei Corporate Governance Evaluation System (CGES). 
Data for company announcements (document releases) are sourced from the Timely 
Disclosure Network (TD-Net).1 Market values are sourced from the CGES BASE files and 
leverage is from the CGES INDEX files. Other firm-specific data are sourced from the 
Nomura Research Institute. Information on daily share prices and returns are sourced from 
Financial Data Solutions. The date of the annual earnings announcement is sourced from TD-
Net, Bloomberg, I/B/E/S, Nikkei’s financial database (NEEDS) and Worldscope.2 Monthly 
observations on analyst following and both forecasts and actual values of annual Earnings Per 
Share (EPS) are sourced from I/B/E/S. We use the Nikkei’s industry definitions to create 12 
sector sub-groupings, as shown in Table 1.3 Matching across the various data sources yields a 
sample of 14,116 firm-year observations on 1,754 unique firms for the documents and prices 
models, and 78,791 firm-month observations on 1,338 unique firms for the analyst forecast 
analysis.4 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Measuring Corporate Governance 
CGES rates the quality of each firm’s CG annually based upon disclosures in publicly 
available documents. Its rating system was developed with Japanese firms in mind, although 
it does take a ‘Western’ norm as the benchmark of good CG, as demonstrated below. These 
data therefore provides an excellent opportunity to test whether better CG as assessed largely 
against Western norms is associated with greater information transparency in Japan. The CG 
data are reported as at August of each year, and we assume CG data reported in August of 
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year t relate to financial results released during the 12 months from 1 August of year t-1 to 31 
July of year t.  
We employ both a composite measure of CG as well as three sub-indexes, namely Board 
Organization, Board Behavior, and Ownership. Board Organization reflects the size and 
composition of the board of directors, including the proportion of independent directors, and 
whether the firm has adopted the Committees system. Better CG, as assessed by Board 
Organization, has the following characteristics: (a) a smaller board of directors for more 
efficient decision making (as found by Yermack, 1996); (b) a greater proportion of 
independent directors for monitoring purposes (Beasley, 1996); and (c) board committees 
(audit, nomination and remuneration) to facilitate greater separation between the execution 
and monitoring of corporate activities. Board Behavior assesses the level of directors’ share 
ownership (both in terms of market value and percentage of total shares on issue) and 
whether a long term incentive plan exists. Better CG, as assessed by Board Behavior, has the 
following characteristics: (a) greater director share ownership; and (b) the use of stock 
options in place to mitigate agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Ownership uses 
the level of ownership by outside parties to proxy for the amount of monitoring they provide. 
Better CG, as assessed by Ownership, has the following characteristics: (a) greater holdings 
by institutional and foreign investors; (b) less ownership by stable investors (e.g. banks); (c) 
fewer cross-shareholdings, as they reduce external monitoring (Jiang and Kim, 2004); (d) no 
ownership by a dominant company (e.g. a parent company); and (e) fewer smaller investors, 
as they have less economic incentive to monitor.  
For each aspect of a firm’s CG (e.g. for board size or the proportion of independent 
directors) CGES assigns a value between 1 and 5 for that year. When aggregating the scores 
into the relevant sub-index, the score is reverse coded, where necessary, to ensure all scores 
are increasing in CG quality. For each CG sub-index (Board Organization, Board Behavior, 
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and Ownership) we calculate a weighted average score using the weightings provided by 
CGES; equal weighting is investigated in robustness tests. Finally, we divide the aggregated 
scores into deciles and replace each aggregated score with its decile value. Since focussing on 
one sub-index of CG may not adequately capture the underlying relationship, we use an 
overall index of CG (CG Composite) which, consistent with other papers on governance (e.g. 
Beekes et al. 2016), is the simple sum of the three sub-indexes. 
Table 1 shows the mean value of CG by industry for the documents and prices sample. 
Board Organization, Board Behavior, and Ownership have mean values of 5.045, 4.828 and 
7.103 respectively. (Decile scoring is based upon all firms in the CGES database, but the 
documents and prices sample is limited to the First Section of TSE which is why averages are 
not 5.5 for each.) CG Composite has a mean value of 16.976 (Table 1); and, while most firms 
score well on Ownership, there is significant variation in CG quality by industry in Board 
Organization and Board Behavior.  
METHOD 
Documents and Timeliness Models 
In this section we discuss the models relating to the number of documents, and the 
timeliness of documents and prices together because of commonality in the periodicity of the 
data and similarities in the metrics used. Equation (1) models the quantity and timeliness of a 
firm’s disclosures, and the timeliness of price discovery of the firm’s shares, as a function of 
the firm’s CG structure plus a set of control variables. We estimate Equation (1) using pooled 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods with standard errors clustered by firm.  
ܦ݁݌ܸܽݎ௜௧ ൌ 	଴ ൅	ଵܥܩ௜௧ ൅	ଶܵ݅ݖ݁࢏࢚ି૚ ൅	ଷܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁࢏࢚ ൅	ସܩ݋݋݀	ܰ݁ݓݏ࢏࢚ 
൅	ସܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ࢏࢚ ൅ ߛ	ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜ ൅ 	ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅	௜௧     (1)	
where DepVar is a measure of disclosure or timeliness (detailed below); CG is Corporate 
Governance (described earlier); Size is the natural log of the firm’s market value of equity 
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measured at the prior year end; Leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets, 
measured at the year-end; Good News is an indicator variable equal to one when the firm’s 
share price outperforms the firm’s domestic market index over the year, and zero otherwise; 
Volatility is the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted returns over the 90 days 
immediately prior to the period over which the document count or timeliness is computed; 
Industry is a vector of sector variables; Year is a vector of year indicator variables; i and t are 
firm and year subscripts respectively; and ௜௧	is the error term.  
CG, the main explanatory variable in equation (1),	captures the marginal effect of better 
CG. Size controls for the positive association between firms’ size and disclosure (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993). Leverage and Volatility control for risk, which may influence investors’ 
disclosure demands (Taylor et al., 2012). Good news captures the positive association 
between the firm’s performance and its disclosures (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Lev and 
Penman, 1990). Industry is included as firms in some sectors (e.g. those that are research 
intensive) are likely to be less transparent because of their greater proprietary costs 
(Verrecchia, 1983).  
Dependent Variables.  
The dependent variables focus upon the number of disclosures by the firm to the TSE and 
the timeliness of those disclosures, as well as the firm’s overall transparency to investors as 
proxied by the timeliness of price discovery. To obtain the number of disclosures by the firm, 
we count the number of individual documents filed with the TSE over 365 days ending on the 
firm’s annual earnings release date, denoted day 0 in the documents analysis, following prior 
literature (e.g. BB06 and Beekes et al. 2015, 2016; further details are available from the 
corresponding author). We include all documents filed regardless of whether other documents 




To measure the timeliness of price-sensitive (material) documents (Tdocs), following 
Beekes et al. (2016) we first identify all days on which at least one document was released 
and calculate the stock’s log return (ݎ௧) over the announcement period. That period is taken to 
be the day of the release and the following day (to incorporate announcements made after 
market closing), or the day of the release only if another announcement is made the following 
day (to avoid double-counting). These returns are then used to construct three time series 
representing the cumulative time series for the absolute value of returns relating to all news 
(both good and bad), for returns relating to good news, and for returns relating to bad news: 
ܥܦ௧஺ ൌ ܥܦ௧ିଵ஺ ൅ |ݎ௧|; ܥܦ௧ீ ൌ ܥܦ௧ିଵீ ൅ ݎ௧, ݎ௧ ൐ 0	; and ܥܦ௧஻ ൌ ܥܦ௧ିଵ஻ െ ݎ௧, ݎ௧ ൏ 0 (the initial 
value of each time series is set to 0). Each time series is used, in turn, to calculate Tdocs as 
set out in Eq. 2, and in the same fashion to calculate Tdocs Good and Tdocs Bad: 
ܶ݀݋ܿݏ ൌ ሺሺ∑ ሺܥܦ଴஺ െ ܥܦ௧஺ሻ/ܥܦ଴஺ሻ െ 0.5ሻ/365௧ୀିଵ௧ୀିଷ଺ହ    (2) 
The constant -0.5/365 is an adjustment to centre the flow of documents over the course of the 
day and day 0 is the annual earnings announcement date itself. More timely releases to the 
TSE are manifest in a smaller value of ܶ݀݋ܿݏ.  
 The timeliness of prices, ܶ,  measures how quickly value-relevant information is 
incorporated into a firm’s share price over the course of the year leading up to the 
announcement of the firm’s annual earnings (for further explanation and justification of this 
measure see Beekes and Brown, 2007; Beekes et al., 2015, 2016). It tracks stock price 
movements for 365 calendar days, ending 14 days after the release of the firm’s earnings for 
the year. T is measured as in Eq. (3): 
ܶ ൌ ሺሺ∑ | logሺ ଴ܲሻ െ logሺ ௧ܲሻ|	௧ୀିଵ௧ୀିଷ଺ହ ሻ െ 0.5ሻ/365	                    (3) 
where tP  is the daily market-adjusted share price;  and day 0 is 14 days after the 
announcement date, which is expected to be long enough for prices to settle following the 
earnings announcement. Note that if daily log returns were i.i.d. (independently and 
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identically distributed), ܶ  would have an expected value of 0.5. Because the timeliness 
measure ܶ may be biased by idiosyncratic share price volatility, following BB06 we deflate ܶ 
by one plus the absolute return over the period for which timeliness is calculated, denoted as 
Timeliness Deflated (Tdef).   
We also measure the timeliness of good, bad and all news in prices in much the same 
way. For the timeliness of good news in prices (Tgood), a market-adjusted daily log return 
series is created, (ݎ௧∗, ݐ ൌ ݏ, … , 0ሻ, where ݏ is the starting day of the series (when timeliness is 
calculated from returns, ݏ ൌ െ364	for the annual timeliness measure). Then a time series of 
cumulative good news returns in created, ܥ௧ீ ,	by setting ܥିଷ଺ହீ ൌ 0 and cumulating the daily 
market-adjusted log return series ܥ௧ீ ൌ ܥ௧ିଵீ ൅ r௧ீ  from day -364 to day 0, where ݎ௧ீ ൌ ݎ௧∗		if 
ݎ௧∗ ൐ 0; otherwise ݎ௧ீ ൌ 0. Unlike Beekes et al. (2016) we do not use filtered returns in our 
primary measure of Tgood; measures of timeliness of prices using filtered returns are used in 
sensitivity analysis, discussed later. The timeliness of good news in prices (Tgood) is then 
calculated as in Eq. (4):  
ܶ݃݋݋݀ ൌ ሺሺ∑ ሺܥ଴ீ െ ܥ௧ீ ሻ/ܥ଴ீ ሻ െ 0.5ሻ/365௧ୀିଵ௧ୀିଷ଺ହ     (4) 
The same method is used for the timeliness of bad news (ܾܶܽ݀). The timeliness of all news 
(݈݈ܶܽ) is the weighted sum of good and bad news measures where the weights sum to one and 
are ሺܥ଴ீ /ሾܥ଴ீ ൅ ܥ଴஻ሿሻ	and ሺܥ଴஻/ሾܥ଴ீ ൅ ܥ଴஻ሿሻ  respectively. ܥ௧ீ  and ܥ௧஻  are the unsigned good 
and bad news cumulative values at the end of day 0. 
Analyst Models 
The model in Eq. (5) is used to assess whether the properties of analysts’ EPS forecasts 
and the level of analyst following differ according to a firm’s CG. The model also includes a 
set of control variables that may affect properties of analysts’ forecasts and confound their 
relationship with CG. 
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ܦ݁݌ܸܽݎ௜௧ ൌ 	଴ ൅	ଵܥܩ௜௧ ൅ 	ࣂ࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙࢏࢚ 	൅ ߛ	ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜ ൅ 	ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅	௜௧  (5) 
where ܦ݁݌ܸܽݎ is a property of EPS forecasts (Bias, Accuracy, Disagreement or Following). 
Bias is the signed Forecast Error (FE), with FE defined as the mean forecast EPS less EPS as 
reported by I/B/E/S, deflated by the base price (share price a year before the announcement 
month); Accuracy is the absolute value of the FE, deflated by the base price; Disagreement is 
measured by the standard deviation across analysts’ forecasts for that firm-month, deflated by 
the base price; and Following is the number of analysts contributing to the consensus 
forecasts. ࡯࢕࢔࢚࢘࢕࢒࢙ is a vector of control variables including Volatility, firm size (Size), 
previous forecast error (PrevFE) and its absolute value (AbsPrevFE), and forecast horizon 
(Horizon). The Bias and Accuracy models control for Following and Disagreement, and the 
Disagreement model controls for Following. Volatility is calculated from daily returns in the 
90 days ended the day before the I/B/E/S forecast date and Size is the natural log of the firm’s 
market value of equity also on that day. Horizon is the number of months from the forecast 
date to the earnings announcement date. PrevFE is last year’s FE for the same firm and 
forecast horizon, deflated by the previous year’s base price and AbsPrevFE is the absolute 
value of PrevFE. Other variables are as previously defined. 
In Eq. (5), CG is the main explanatory variable. Volatility is a proxy for earnings 
predictability since the financial performance of firms with more volatile earnings is more 
difficult to predict. Firm size is included as analysts tend to follow larger firms (Bhushan, 
1989). Forecast horizon controls for greater forecast accuracy closer to the earnings 
announcement date. The previous year’s forecast error (PrevFE) and its absolute value are 
included because larger errors may encourage analysts to collect additional information to 






Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Descriptive statistics for the documents and prices models are presented in Table 2, panel 
A. The number of documents (Docs) released per firm ranges from 2 to 122 over the year. 
The average is roughly 1.4 documents per month, which is significantly lower than the 6 
documents per month released by the average Australian firm (BB06) and suggests Japanese 
firms may be less forthcoming with information than firms in some other countries. 
Timeliness (T) ranges between 0.011 and 1.999, and from 0.011 to 0.646 when deflated by 
one plus the absolute rate of return (Tdef). The average timeliness, T, (Tdef) in Japan is 0.156 
(0.118), compared with Australian firms in BB06 of 0.219 (0.145). Interestingly, this would 
imply Japanese firms have more timely price discovery compared with Australian firms, but 
differences in firm-level volatility across countries make a direct comparison difficult. Firm 
size (Size) in terms of market capitalisation ranges from ¥781 million to ¥24,400 billion. Over 
half the observations are taken from years where the company out-performed the market 
(Good news mean = 0.610).  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Correlations for the documents and prices analysis are shown in Table 3, panel A. All 
measures of CG are positively associated with the log of the number of documents released 
(Ldocs). CG Composite is positively associated with measures of timeliness where 
correlations are significant. Board Behavior however is negatively associated with Tgood, but 
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positively associated with Tbad, providing initial evidence that components of CG may work 
differently.  
Descriptive statistics for the analyst models are presented in Table 2, panel B. On average 
about seven analysts contribute to the monthly consensus EPS forecast (Following 
mean=7.372). Forecasts are optimistic on average: the mean forecast bias is 1.4 per cent of 
the base share price. Mean Accuracy (Disagreement) is 2.7 (0.7) per cent of the base share 
price.  This compares favourably with data for Australian firms in BB06, where mean 
Accuracy (Disagreement) is 6.9 (1.1) per cent of the base share price. It is also consistent 
with Hope (2003) who shows EPS forecasts for Japanese firms tend to have less forecast 
dispersion and smaller forecast error compared with firms in other countries. Volatility 
ranges from less than 1 per cent to 11.1 per cent per day, the average being 1.8 per cent. 
Bivariate correlations in Table 3, Panel B show CG Composite is associated positively 
with Bias, Accuracy and Following and negatively with Disagreement. On the surface better-
governed firms are associated with greater forecast optimism, a larger forecast error and a 
larger analyst following, while there is less disagreement among the analysts on the firm’s 
future performance. Individual CG measures (Board Organization, Board Behavior and 
Ownership) operate differently. We delve more deeply into these relationships in multivariate 
analysis. 
Disclosure and its Timeliness 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Results for models of the relationship between the firm’s CG and the frequency and 
timeliness of its disclosures are in Table 4. The coefficients reported in the tables relate to 
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standardised explanatory variables, to assist interpretation.5 Results show a complementary 
(positive) association between CG and disclosure frequency (Table 4, column 1, coeff. = 
0.0958, p <0.01) which is consistent with Hypothesis 1 and previous evidence (e.g. BB06, 
Beekes et al. 2016). Recall smaller values of timeliness are associated with more timely 
(earlier) disclosures. We find better governance is associated with more timely release of 
documents to the TSE (column 2, coeff. = -0.0033, p <0.01), consistent with Hypothesis 2 
and Beekes et al. (2016). Firms whose stock price outperforms the market over the year make 
fewer disclosures and are on the whole less timely in their disclosures: the Good News 
coefficient is negative in column (1) and positive in column (2). All regressions include year 
and industry fixed effects but for brevity their details are omitted from the tables. 
Given the TSE encourages firms to provide information to all parties in an unbiased 
manner, we separately examine whether the favourability of news (i.e. whether it is good or 
bad) affects the timeliness of disclosures. When there is good news (Tdocs Good), results 
show better-governed firms are significantly more timely when releasing price-sensitive 
documents to the TSE (Column 3, coeff. = -0.004, p = 0.05). However, we do not find a 
comparable effect for bad news documents (Tdocs Bad, Column 4), suggesting an 
asymmetric response to news favourability. Consistent with this result, Beekes et al. (2016) 
find code law countries (such as Japan) make earlier announcements of good news relative to 
bad news, which they attribute to lower litigation pressure in code law countries. 
In sum we find CG is associated with both the frequency and the timeliness of 
disclosures. 




Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Results for the analyst models are in Table 5. In these models, the standard errors are 
clustered by firm-year since forecasts for each firm-year can be included up to 11 times in 
each estimation sample. Note that Bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts may be positive 
(optimistic) or negative (conservative) and lower values of Accuracy indicate greater forecast 
accuracy. Table 5 shows better CG is associated with a greater optimism in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts (column 1, coeff. = 0.0033, p <0.01) and correspondingly forecasts are less accurate 
(column 2, coeff. = 0.0026, p <0.01). This is contrary to Hypotheses 4 and 5, and differs from 
prior evidence. BB06 reported, for Australian firms, a one standard deviation increase in the 
‘quality’ of CG was associated with a 37% reduction in average bias. This inconsistency may 
be due to the previous inability of Japanese analysts to correctly appraise the influence of 
changes in CG on monitoring insiders, or on the credibility of information provided to 
outside parties. Alternatively, analysts may have over-weighted the importance of CG in 
determining financial performance. Yet another possibility is that the optimistic bias reflects 
the price analysts pay for greater access to managers when framing their forecasts. 
There is less dispersion in analysts’ forecasts about future earnings of firms with better 
CG (Table 5, column 3, coeff. = -0.0002, p = 0.10). BB06 find analysts have more divergent 
views for Australian firms with better CG. However, as mentioned earlier, idiosyncratic 
information generated by analysts for firms which provide more information does not 
necessarily lead to greater consensus (Barron et al., 2002), which may explain the apparent 
inconsistency. Analyst following is found to be positively associated with CG quality (Table 
5, column 4, coeff. = 0.5286, p <0.01), consistent with Hypothesis 3 and prior evidence for 
Australia (BB06). The coefficients of the control variables typically have their expected sign. 
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In sum our results suggest CG is associated with greater analyst following but more 
optimistic and less accurate forecasts. 
Timeliness of Price Discovery 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Results for the timeliness of price discovery are presented in Table 6. Stock prices of 
better-governed firms reflect performance information in a less timely fashion (columns 1 
and 2), which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 6. CG is not a statistically significant factor in 
the timeliness of all news (Tall, column 3). Control variables generally have coefficients with 
the expected sign except for Good News, which suggests the firm’s shares are priced less 
efficiently when they outperform the market average that year. When the speed of price 
discovery is measured separately for the stock’s good and bad news days on the market, 
better CG is associated with faster stock price discovery for good news (Column 4, coeff. = -
0.0009, p = 0.05) although there is no comparable effect for bad news (Column 5). This 
differs from Beekes et al. (2016), who report the shares of better governed firms in code law 
countries such as Japan are typically priced less efficiently, irrespective of whether the news 
is good or bad. 
Interpretation 
In this section we summarise the extent of support for our hypotheses on the link between 
CG and corporate transparency in Japan. First, we find a positive association between CG and 
disclosure frequency. Second, we find the timeliness of disclosure is also related to the firm’s 
CG structures in that firms with better CG make more timely disclosures (which are 
integrated into stock prices) when their news is good. This asymmetric focus on good rather 
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than bad news may be due to cultural pressures; for example, there is evidence that managers 
tend to be optimistic in their earnings forecasts (Cho et al., 2011). Perhaps managers feel that 
giving priority to bad news may lead to termination of their employment contract, as bad 
news may be perceived as personal failure. Alternatively, it may mean that outside directors 
are less effective monitors when their boards are dominated by insiders (Buchanan et al., 
2014). Third, we find firms with better CG are followed by more analysts, although the 
analysts’ earnings forecasts are more optimistic and less accurate, which is consistent with 
analysts placing too much emphasis on the importance of CG for the firm’s future 
performance. 
ADDITIONAL RESULTS  
Components of Corporate Governance 
To focus on which sub-components of CG are more influential we re-estimated our 
results including Board Organization, Board Behavior and Ownership as separate 
explanatory variables in place of their sum, CG Composite. The coefficients on the CG sub-
indexes are reported in Table 7. All three components of CG are positively associated with 
the overall level of disclosure, consistent with the main results (column 1, panel A). However 
the timeliness of disclosures varies by component. Board Organization and Board Behavior 
are associated with more timely disclosures to the stock market (column 2, panel A). 
Ownership, however, is weakly associated with less timely disclosures, especially for bad 
news (column 4, panel A). This result is contrary to our prediction and to sentiments in 
Skinner (1994): it implies firms with greater cross-shareholdings and bank relationships make 
more timely disclosures. We conclude that while all three components of CG are positively 
associated with the quantum of disclosures, only board structures and directors’ incentives 
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improve the timeliness of those disclosures. In particular, greater monitoring by outside 
shareholders has not increased the timeliness of disclosures. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------ 
The results for the analyst models are in panel B. Consistent with our main results (Table 
5), all sub-components of CG are associated with greater analyst following, and with more 
optimistic and less accurate earnings forecasts. Board Behavior is associated with less 
disagreement among the analysts, perhaps because firms with better Board Behavior achieve 
a greater alignment between directors’ and shareholders’ incentives (column 3, panel B). 
Ownership is associated with less agreement, perhaps indicating analysts have differing 
views on the influence of ownership structure on monitoring effectiveness and ultimately on 
the firm’s financial performance. In sum, although analyst following is positively associated 
with CG, the quality of their forecasts appears to be greater for firms with lower quality CG.  
The timeliness of prices differs according to aspects of CG, as shown in panel C of Table 
7. Board Behavior is associated with faster price discovery for good news, but slower price 
discovery for bad news, as in the main analysis (columns 3 and 4, panel C). Ownership is 
associated with timelier price discovery for bad news, but there is no significant association 
for good news. This may suggest there is potentially greater litigation pressure, perhaps 
foreign-sourced, for firms with greater external ownership. There is no significant association 
between Board Organization and the timeliness of prices.  
We conclude the size and composition of the board of directors and its committees 
influences disclosure policies: better Board Organization encourages more disclosures to the 
TSE and on a timelier basis. Greater alignment of interests between managers and 
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shareholders, through share ownership and incentives, is also accompanied by a greater 
number of disclosures; however the disclosure of bad news is delayed, perhaps for 
opportunistic reasons. This asymmetry between the disclosure of good and bad news is 
reflected in the timeliness of prices for firms with better Board Behavior. Firms with greater 
external share ownership (higher Ownership) make more disclosures, but disclosure of bad 
news is less timely. Despite this pattern, stocks are priced more efficiently for bad news when 
there is greater external ownership. Thus, even if firms were to attempt to conceal bad news, 
it may be the case that the absence of any bad news will prompt investors to correct stock 
prices more quickly anyway. Finally, regardless of the component of CG, analysts’ views of 
firms with better CG appear to be overly optimistic, consistent with them ascribing too much 
influence to better CG on the credibility of corporate disclosures and thereby overestimating 
the future performance of the firm.  
Robustness Testing  
We conducted a number of robustness tests (results not tabulated): (i) excluding 
observations for firms which follow the Committees System of CG (as in the West), resulting 
in a loss of 2% of observations in the documents and prices sample and 4% in the analyst 
sample; (ii) using alternative measures for firm size (log of total assets and log of total 
revenues); (iii) using equal weightings for the components of CG within each subgroup; (iv) 
using a measure of CG which is not re-based annually to allow the data to reflect changes in 
CG over time; (v) using the value of CG in the previous year; (vi) including the book-to-
market ratio as an additional explanatory variable to control for growth opportunities, 
because firms with greater growth opportunities may prefer less disclosure due to proprietary 
costs (Verrecchia, 1983); (vii) confining the estimation sample to the 80% of cases with a 
March year end; (viii) censoring the top and bottom 1 per cent of dependent variables to 
control for outliers; (ix) including an additional explanatory variable to control for the annual 
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reporting lag; (x) using Poisson estimation methods for the disclosure frequency models to 
allow for count dependent variables; (xi) using alternative measures of Tgood, Tbad and Tall 
which take into account the reporting lag or filter out smaller returns because they are likely 
to be more noisy; and (xii) using a smaller database on analysts’ forecasts, provided by the 
International Financial Information Service (IFIS), an alternative to I/B/E/S. Results, which 
are available from the corresponding author, are broadly consistent across the various 
specifications. We also investigated the use of instrumental variable methods to control for 
endogeneity in CG. However, we could not identify reliable instruments for our models, 
largely for reasons discussed in Larcker and Rusticus (2007) and Brown et al. (2011). 
Consequently we base our findings on OLS estimates with clustered standard errors. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We examined the association between CG and Japanese firms’ transparency to external 
investors from mid-2003 to mid-2014. During this period CG was the subject of major 
regulatory attention. In particular, the TSE released a set of CG principles which specifically 
identify corporate transparency and disclosure as an important issue for Japanese firms; listed 
companies had the choice of adopting a Committees system of CG as in the West, in lieu of 
the Corporate Auditors system that is traditional in Japan; since 2009 each listed company 
has been required to appoint at least one independent director or an independent statutory 
auditor; and ownership structures have evolved resulting in smaller cross-shareholdings and 
greater foreign ownership, which have created different expectations in terms of CG and 
transparency.  
We used data from CGES which rates the CG of firms based upon Western principles 
adapted to the Japanese environment. Japan thus provides a good test of whether aspects 
associated with better CG in the West (such as smaller boards of directors with greater 
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independent director representation, greater directors’ share ownership, and smaller cross-
shareholdings coupled with greater external ownership) influence the informativeness of 
disclosures in Japan. We do this firstly by examining the frequency and timing of corporate 
disclosures. Secondly, we examine transparency from the perspective of financial 
intermediaries, specifically financial analysts, by studying differences in the level of bias, 
accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts, and the number of analysts following 
a stock. Thirdly, we examine the speed of stock price discovery over 12 months leading up to 
the announcement of the firm’s earnings for the year. 
We conclude increased monitoring provided by better CG is effective at increasing the 
overall quantity of disclosures made, consistent with expectations and prior research. Results 
also show CG is associated with greater analyst following and more consensus in earnings 
forecasts. Unlike prior work for Australia (BB06), we find analyst forecasts are more 
optimistic and less accurate for better-governed Japanese firms, which may be attributed to 
analysts placing too much weight on the influence of CG on the credibility of information 
releases. Price discovery is faster for Japanese firms with better CG, but only when the stock 
market considers their news is good. The asymmetric timeliness of good over bad news in 
releases to the stock market and also in the market’s incorporation of news is a novel finding 
and was not found by Beekes et al. (2016). Our results are consistent with managers 
responding opportunistically to incentives to increase the timeliness of good news, which 
follows through to the stock market’s reaction.  
This study includes an important implication for policy-makers and practitioners. 
Different CG mechanisms affect disclosures and their informativeness to market participants. 
So far the adoption of Western style CG structures has been only partially effective. In 
particular, when framing future guidelines there may be benefit in focusing on promoting the 





1 This captures both mandatory and voluntary disclosures to the TSE. All documents are assigned a three-digit 
classification code by the TSE. If a disclosure document is assigned more than one classification code, each is 
separately counted to include multiple contents. Document releases include information on financial results, 
earnings and dividend forecasts and other disclosures about share capital, as well as voluntary disclosures. 
2 The identification of earnings announcement dates was a complex process in which we triangulated the 
different sources of data. Where differences in the announcement dates were identified, we compared the current 
and adjacent financial year end dates and examined the respective reporting lags. We then recorded the earliest 
plausible announcement date. 
3  The Nikkei industry classifications are finely partitioned and consequently some industries have few 
observations in our sample. We were unable to map the 36 Nikkei industry classifications on to other commonly 
used industry sector definitions. Also we were unable to source Global Industry Classification Standard for all 
sample companies. 
4 In the documents and prices sample, the number of observations by CGES year (2004 – 2013) is as follows: 
1,134, 1,323, 1,402, 1,455, 1,484, 1,489, 1466, 1,447, 1,453 and 1,463. For the analysts’ sample, the number of 
observations by CGES year (2004 – 2014) is as follows: 7,773, 7,478, 7,853, 8,361, 7,673, 7,457, 7,543, 7,082, 
7,078, 7,147 and 3,346. 
5 The intercept term in each model is the mean of the dependent variable and for continuous variables the 
coefficient indicates the marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase on the dependent variable. For 
binary variables, the coefficient indicates the marginal effect of changing the category (from coded 0 to coded 1) 
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Mean Corporate Governance Scores in Documents and Prices Sample, by Industry  
 
Industrial Sector Description (Nikkei Industry Codes) No of obs. 
Components of CG: 
CG Composite Board 
Organization 
Board 
Behavior Ownership  
1. Food and Fishing (1, 35) 689 4.983 4.405 6.599 15.987 
2. Chemicals, Petrochemicals and Pharmaceuticals (7, 9, 11) 1,501 5.029 4.574 7.387 16.991 
3. Iron and Steel, Non-ferrous Metal and Metal Products (17, 19) 886 4.708 3.611 7.069 15.387 
4. Machinery (21) 1,128 4.998 4.738 7.480 17.217 
5. Electric and Electronic Equipment (23) 1,506 5.831 4.894 7.947 18.672 
6. Motor vehicles and Autoparts (27) 465 3.591 4.501 7.092 15.185 
7. Transportation and Equipment, Warehousing and Harbor 
Transportation (29, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63) 703 3.902 3.710 6.585 14.196 
8. Construction (41) 930 3.734 3.269 6.381 13.384 
9. Wholesale and Retail Trade (43, 45) 2,313 5.418 5.829 6.967 18.214 
10. Utilities and Communications Services (65, 67, 69) 307 4.521 4.062 7.977 16.560 
11. Services (71) 1,627 5.671 6.492 6.638 18.801 
12. Other (3, 5, 13, 15, 25, 31, 33, 37, 53) 2,061 5.147 4.518 7.150 16.815 
Total Sample (All industries) 14,116 5.045 4.828 7.103 16.976 
Notes: The sample (ܰ ൌ 14,116) comprises Japanese firms with year ends between 1 August 2003 and 31 July 2013. Board Organization, Board 
Behavior and Ownership are measures of three components of corporate governance quality as assessed by CGES; CG Composite is the sum of the 







Panel A: Documents and Prices Models 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Docs        14,116  16.440 14 8.516 2 122 
Ldocs        14,116  2.764 2.708 0.423 1.099 4.812 
Tdocs        13,561  0.543 0.543 0.110 0.129 0.964 
Tdocs Good        13,561  0.539 0.538 0.164 0.007 0.999 
Tdocs Bad        13,561  0.538 0.535 0.160 0.004 0.999 
T 14,116 0.156 0.121 0.125 0.011 1.999 
Tdef        14,116  0.118 0.102 0.070 0.011 0.646 
Tgood        14,116  0.504 0.503 0.051 0.275 0.772 
Tbad        14,116  0.505 0.504 0.042 0.338 0.732 
Tall        14,116  0.504 0.503 0.041 0.348 0.700 
CG Composite        14,116  16.976 17 5.494 3 30 
Board Organization        14,116  5.045 5 3.070 1 10 
Board Behavior        14,116  4.828 5 2.821 1 10 
Ownership         14,116  7.103 8 2.585 1 10 
Size(¥m)       14,116       215,859         42,173       731,059            781  24,400,000  
Lev        14,116  51.376 52.075 20.397 1.540 219.550 
Volatility_Docs 14,116 0.019 0.017 0.010 0.003 0.130 
Volatility_Prices        14,116  0.017 0.015 0.007 0.004 0.137 
Good News = 1        14,116  0.610   0 1 
Panel B: Analyst Models  
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Bias         78,791  0.014 0.001 0.089 -0.645 3.972 
Accuracy         78,791  0.027 0.009 0.086 0.000 3.972 
Disagreement         78,791  0.007 0.004 0.019 0.000 2.400 
Following         78,791  7.372 6 5.225 2 30 
CG Composite  78,791 19.443 20 4.978 4 30 
Board Organization  78,791 5.224 5 3.211 1 10 
Board Behavior  78,791 5.705 6 2.820 1 10 
Ownership  78,791 8.514 9 1.753 1 10 
Prev FE  78,791 0.010 0.001 0.077 -0.645 4.177 
Abs(PrevFE)  78,791 0.023 0.008 0.074 0.000 4.177 
Size(¥m)         78,791        417,042         135,325        1,024,137  1,845        24,400,000  
Lev         78,791 48.600 48.950 19.750 1.540 99.780 
Volatility_Analyst         78,791  0.018 0.017 0.009 0.002 0.111 
Horizon         78,791  6.075 6 3.120 1 11 
Notes: Docs is the number of documents filed with the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the year. Ldocs is the 
natural logarithm of Docs. Tdocs is the timeliness of documents weighted by stock returns associated with the 
document release. Tdocs Good (Bad) is the timeliness of documents when there is good (bad) news weighted 
by stock returns at the time of the release; news associated with a document release is classified as good or bad 
dependent upon the unadjusted return for that particular day; a price rise is classified as ‘good news’ and a 
price decline is classified as ‘bad news’. T is the timeliness metric for stock prices and is calculated as the 
average over 365 days of the absolute difference between the log of market-adjusted daily share price and its 
counterpart 14 days after the release of the firm’s financial results for the year. Tdef is T divided by one plus 
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the absolute value of the market-adjusted rate of return over the period for which T is measured. Tgood is the 
timeliness of prices on days when the stock price rose relative to the market index and Tbad is the timeliness 
of prices when it fell. Tall is the timeliness of all price movements, i.e. taking both negative and positive 
market-adjusted daily returns into account. Bias is the signed forecast error (FE) and is the mean forecast 
Earnings Per Share (EPS) less EPS as reported by I/B/E/S, deflated by the base share price (share price a year 
before the announcement month). Accuracy is the absolute value of the FE. Disagreement is the level of 
disagreement among analysts, measured by the standard deviation across analysts’ forecasts for that firm-
month deflated by the base price. Following is the number of analysts contributing to the consensus forecast. 
Size in the documents and timeliness models is the market value of equity (in ¥ million) at the end of the 
previous financial year, and in the analysts’ sample is the market value of equity (in ¥ million) a day before the 
I/B/E/S monthly cut-off date. Lev is the firm’s leverage defined as total liabilities divided by total assets at the 
end of the financial year. Volatility_Docs is the standard deviation of daily log returns over the 90 day period 
ending the day before the start of the period over which Docs is measured. Volatility_Prices is the standard 
deviation of daily log returns over the 90 day period ending the day before the start of the period for which T is 
measured. Good News is a dummy variable equal to one if the market-adjusted return over the period for 
which T is measured is positive, and zero otherwise. Volatility_Analyst is the standard deviation of daily log 
returns in the 90 trading days ended the day before the I/B/E/S forecast cut-off date. PrevFE is the last year’s 
FE, deflated by previous year’s base price; Abs(PrevFE) is the absolute value of PrevFe. Horizon is the 
forecast horizon, measured by the number of months from the forecast cut-off date until the company makes 





PANEL A: Variables in Documents and Prices Models (N = 14,116) 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] 
1. Docs  
2. Ldocs 0.94*  
3. T 0.08* 0.08*  
4. Tdef 0.08* 0.08* 0.94*  
5. Tgood 0.02 0.02* 0.28* 0.31*  
6. Tbad 0.00 0.00 0.17* 0.17* 0.51*  
7. Tall 0.01 0.01 0.28* 0.31* 0.90* 0.84*  
8. CG Composite 0.28* 0.28* 0.02* 0.02* -0.01 0.01 -0.00  
9. Board Organization 0.18* 0.18* 0.05* 0.05* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.65*  
10. Board Behavior 0.19* 0.19* 0.00 -0.01 -0.03* 0.02* -0.01 0.66* 0.08*  
11. Ownership 0.17* 0.18* -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02* -0.02* 0.64* 0.09* 0.22*  
12. Size 0.19* 0.18* -0.06* -0.07* 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.13* -0.00 0.05* 0.22*  
13. Lev 0.08* 0.07* 0.15* 0.15* 0.03* -0.01 0.02 -0.24* -0.04* -0.31* -0.12* 0.02  
14.Volatility_Docs 0.01 -0.01 0.22* 0.22* -0.15* -0.21* -0.20* -0.02* 0.07* -0.12* -0.00 -0.09* 0.22*   
15. Volatility_Prices 0.10* 0.08* 0.57* 0.55* 0.12* 0.08* 0.12* -0.01 0.10* -0.09* -0.03* -0.12* 0.24* 0.51*  









PANEL B: Variables in the Analysts’ Regressions (N= 78,791) 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] 
1. Bias 
2. Accuracy 0.92* 
3. Disagreement 0.32* 0.38* 
4. Following -0.03* -0.05* 0.00 
5. CG Composite 0.03* 0.01* -0.02* 0.13* 
6. Board Organization 0.03* 0.04* 0.02* 0.08* 0.74* 
7. Board Behavior 0.01* -0.03* -0.07* -0.09* 0.65* 0.12* 
8. Ownership 0.01 0.00 0.02* 0.38* 0.42* 0.09* 0.03* 
9. Prev FE 0.17* 0.22* 0.23* -0.02* 0.01* 0.04* -0.03* 0.01* 
10. Abs(PrevFE) 0.16* 0.23* 0.25* -0.03* -0.01 0.05* -0.06* 0.00 0.90* 
11. Size -0.03* -0.04* -0.02* 0.51* 0.02* -0.02* -0.04* 0.17* -0.03* -0.04* 
12. Lev 0.09* 0.13* 0.13* 0.07* -0.19* -0.06* -0.28* 0.01* 0.09* 0.14* 0.08* 
13. Volatility_Analyst 0.21* 0.23* 0.17* -0.09* 0.08* 0.07* 0.07* -0.02* 0.11* 0.12* -0.09* 0.07* 
14. Horizon 0.07* 0.10* 0.04* -0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02* 0.05* 0.10* -0.01 0.00 -0.03* 
Notes: The correlation matrix in panel A above excludes the variables Tdocs, Tdocs Good and Tdocs Bad as they are based upon a smaller sample (ܰ ൌ
13,561). Size in this and subsequent tables is the log of the size variable in Table 2; all other variables are as defined in Tables 1 and 2. Correlations 






 The Relationship between Corporate Governance, and the Frequency and Timeliness of 
Disclosures  
Dependent Variable: Ldocs Tdocs Tdocs Good Tdocs Bad 
Column No: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CG Composite 0.0958*** -0.0033*** -0.0040** -0.0011 
 [13.87] [-2.84] [-2.33] [-0.65] 
Size 0.0838*** -0.0096*** -0.0060*** -0.0110*** 
 [10.26] [-8.14] [-3.55] [-6.98] 
Leverage 0.0606*** 0.0061*** 0.0081*** 0.0037** 
 [8.31] [5.28] [4.78] [2.41] 
Good News -0.0232*** 0.0097***   
 [-3.33] [4.99]   
Volatility 0.0142** -0.0063*** -0.0104*** -0.0021 
 [2.46] [-4.85] [-5.85] [-1.26] 
F-test 86.38*** 55.32*** 29.97*** 27.79*** 
Adj. R2 0.220 0.081 0.048 0.039 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 14,116 13,561 13,561 13,561 
Notes: All coefficients relate to explanatory variables that have been standardized to assist 
interpretation. Volatility represents the variable Volatility_Docs. The sample comprises firms in the 
CGES database with financial years ending between 1 August 2003 and 31 July 2013. Results are 
estimated using pooled cross section and time series regression fitted by OLS with standard errors 
robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity. All standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables as 





The Relationship between Properties of Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and Analyst Following, and 
Corporate Governance  
 
Dependent Variable: Bias Accuracy Disagreement Following 
Column No: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CG Composite 0.0033*** 0.0026*** -0.0002* 0.5286*** 
 [3.65] [3.08] [-1.66] [14.94] 
Following 0.0011 -0.0001 0.0008***   
 [0.80] [-0.06] [3.41]   
Disagreement 0.0238*** 0.0266***    
 [7.47] [7.24]    
PrevFe 0.0081**     
 [2.12]     
Abs(PrevFE)   0.0097** 0.0038*** -0.0078 
   [2.26] [2.92] [-0.21] 
Volatility_Analyst 0.0092*** 0.0098*** 0.0031*** 0.3095*** 
 [4.67] [5.01] [4.66] [10.01] 
Size -0.0046*** -0.0054*** -0.0013*** 4.2248*** 
 [-2.75] [-3.49] [-4.56] [114.77] 
Leverage 0.0048*** 0.0074*** 0.0018*** -0.0785** 
 [5.24] [7.74] [10.07] [-2.15] 
Horizon 0.0049*** 0.0071*** 0.0005*** 0.0593*** 
 [10.19] [12.11] [3.36] [5.85] 
Adj. R2 0.151 0.210 0.117 0.647 
F-test  16.66*** 29.95*** 50.77*** 597.46*** 
N 78,791 78,791 78,791 78,791 
Year & Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Notes: All coefficients relate to variables that have been standardized to assist interpretation. The 
sample comprises firms in the CGES database with financial years ending between 1 August 2003 and 
31 July 2014. Results are estimated using pooled cross section and time series regression fitted by 
OLS with standard errors robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity. All standard errors are clustered 
by firm-year. Variables as previously defined. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** 




The Relationship between Corporate Governance and the Timeliness of Price Discovery 
Dependent Variable: T Tdef Tall Tgood Tbad 
Column No: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CG Composite 0.0015 0.0013** -0.0002 -0.0009** 0.0002 
 [1.31] [2.05] [-0.67] [-2.21] [0.59] 
Size 0.004*** 0.001 -0.001** 0.000 -0.000 
 [3.15] [1.33] [-2.40] [1.09] [-0.65] 
Leverage 0.0026** 0.00027*** 0.0007** 0.0011** -0.0002 
 [2.12] [3.64] [2.20] [2.53] [-0.58] 
Good News 0.0183*** 0.0099*** 0.0088***   
 [10.26] [9.30] [13.41]   
Volatility 0.0699*** 0.0360*** 0.0021*** 0.0040*** 0.0018*** 
 [26.05] [23.54] [4.31] [6.19] [4.15] 
F-test 106.37*** 133.17*** 221.23*** 121.33*** 269.47*** 
Adj. R2 0.344 0.332 0.293 0.184 0.288 
Year & Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 14,116 14,116 14,116 14,116 14,116 
Notes: All coefficients relate to variables that have been standardized to assist interpretation. Volatility 
represents the variable Volatility_Prices. The sample comprises firms in the CGES database with financial 
years ending between 1 August 2003 and 31 July 2013. Results are estimated using pooled cross section 
and time series regression fitted by OLS with standard errors robust to the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
All standard errors are clustered by firm. Variables as previously defined. t-statistics are shown in 





The Marginal Influence on Transparency of Three Components of Corporate Governance 
PANEL A: Documents  
Column No: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Ldocs Tdocs Tdocs Good Tdocs Bad 
Board Organization  0.0633*** -0.0021** -0.0010 -0.0011 
 [10.58] [-2.03] [-0.68] [-0.74] 
Board Behavior 0.0624*** -0.0044*** -0.0061*** -0.0037** 
 [8.38] [-3.74] [-3.52] [-2.35] 
Ownership 0.0158*** 0.0021 0.0012 0.0039** 
 [2.28] [1.62] [0.66] [2.18] 
PANEL B: Analyst Following and Forecasts  
Dependent Variable: Bias Accuracy Disagreement Following 
Board Organization  0.0012* 0.0018*** 0.0001 0.3108*** 
 [1.65] [2.63] [0.46] [8.97] 
Board Behavior 0.0027*** 0.0009 -0.0009*** 0.1877*** 
 [2.82] [0.96] [-5.53] [5.20] 
Ownership 0.0017** 0.0016** 0.0007*** 0.3854*** 
 [2.18] [2.32] [5.08] [11.32] 
PANEL C: Timeliness of Prices  
Dependent Variable: Tdef Tall Tgood Tbad 
Board Organization  -0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 
 [-0.42] [0.94] [0.03] [0.48] 
Board Behavior 0.0026*** -0.0002 -0.0011** 0.0010*** 
 [4.22] [-0.54] [-2.57] [3.04] 
Ownership -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0010*** 
 [-0.62] [-1.51] [-0.96] [-2.71] 
Notes: All coefficients relate to variables that have been standardized to assist interpretation. The sample 
comprises firms in the CGES database with financial years ending between 1 August 2003 and 31 July 
2013 (panels A and C), and between 1 August 2003 and 31 July 2014 (panel B). Results are estimated 
using pooled cross section and time series regression fitted by OLS with standard errors robust to the 
presence of heteroscedasticity. Standard errors are clustered by firm in panels A and C, and by firm-year 
in panel B. In the interests of brevity, only the coefficients for the corporate governance variables from 
our results are tabulated. Variables as previously defined. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01 (two-tailed t-test). 
 
